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In their row over gas prices, Russia has no reason to
make concessions to Ukraine. There is little to suggest
that an end to the conflict is in sight.
Mar 24 2012
Relations between Russia and Ukraine are at a new low after serious gas
shortages in Europe this winter. Olga Shumylo-Tapiola argues that the interests
of Ukrainian oligarchs will continue to put pressure on the government to demand
lower prices, a demand that Russia is unlikely to acquiesce to. The only long term
solution is for Ukraine to do more to reduce its dependence on Russian natural
gas. 
Russia and Ukraine are engaged in protracted negotiations over a gas deal
originally concluded in 2009 by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and then Ukrainian Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Current Ukrainian authorities consider this deal unsustainable for their
country and, with the Kremlin seemingly unprepared to make significant revisions, there seems to
be no easy solution to the problem.
After taking office in spring 2010, Victor Yanukovych promised to improve Ukraine’s relations with
Russia, especially in the energy sector. Two years on however, relations are worse than ever.
Moscow is frustrated with Yanukovych’s pursuit of his own personal and corporate interests.
Yanukovych, in turn, is frustrated with Russia’s unwillingness to make concessions to him in the
name of Slavonic brotherhood.
From his first day in office, Yanukovych wanted to re-negotiate the 2009 gas deal. Three elements
of the agreement are problematic for him and his fellow oligarchs: the price Ukraine pays for gas,
the volume of Russian gas that Ukraine is obliged to buy on an annual basis, and the fee that Russia
pays to use Ukraine’s gas transit system (GTS).
Kyiv feels that the first two figures should decrease dramatically, while the third should go up. At
almost USD $400 per thousand cubic meters, Ukraine pays one of the highest prices for Russian
gas in Europe—especially given its proximity to Russia. In addition, despite being the least efficient
energy consumer in Europe, it is unlikely that Kyiv will need the 52 billion cubic meters of gas the
agreement with Moscow stipulates in 2012. Moreover, European and Ukrainian experts agree that
the transit fees Russia pays to Ukraine are low in comparison to those paid to other transit
countries.
Will Russia and Ukraine be able to reach an agreement on a revised gas deal?
Some in Moscow say that an agreement addressing Ukraine’s concerns could well be reached.
However, it would come at a high price. By granting Russia a twenty-five year lease extension on its
Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea, Yanukovych attempted to use the carrot in his negotiations with
the Kremlin. Moscow responded with a small discount, knocking $100 off the price per thousand
cubic meters of gas.
But this was not enough for Ukraine. Ultimately,
Russia will need a far larger carrot—control over
Ukraine’s GTS or Kyiv’s membership in the
Customs Union or potentially even the Eurasian
Union—to make any meaningful concessions. When
“the carrot” failed, Yanukovych resorted to “the stick.”
His government publicly blackmailed Moscow by
claiming the 2009 gas agreement was illegal,
arresting Tymoshenko, and threatening to take
Gazprom to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
When Moscow still refused to revise the contract,
Ukraine opted to unilaterally reduce the contracted volume of gas it would purchase from Russia by
nearly 50 per cent. Russia now has three options:
The Kremlin could accept Ukraine’s demand to import less gas;
It could demand that Ukraine pay the penalties the 2009 contract stipulates; or, as a last
resort;
It could take Ukraine to the SCC.
At present Russia is warning Ukraine that it may take legal action, but has not acted so far. In fact,
Moscow is continuing to loan money to Ukraine to pay its bills with Gazprom—Ukraine paid its gas
bill in October 2011 with money borrowed from Russia’s Gazprombank.The two partners are in a
protracted process of negotiations as opposed to a full-blown conflict, which neither side can afford
at the moment. As it stands, Russia simply has no reason to make any concessions to Ukraine. It is
no secret that Moscow uses the price of gas as a political tool in its immediate neighbourhood. With
the leadership of neighbouring countries reluctant to end their addiction to cheap gas, Russia has
no reason to stop this practice. Energy relations between Russia and its neighbours will only
become more equitable once neighbouring elites instil some transparency in their own energy
sectors and stop treating them as their personal fiefdoms.
Moscow, however, needs European support for alternative transit routes, such as South Stream, a
pipeline connecting Russia and Bulgaria. Moreover, it would like to take control of Ukraine’s GTS
without facing accusations of bullying. The Kremlin can therefore ill-afford the bad publicity.  But
Moscow may still intensify the trade war with Kyiv. Exports of Ukrainian cheese to Russia have
already been banned. Other exports, such as confectionery, dairy products, and meats may also be
targeted. And, although it is unlikely that Russia will cut gas to Ukraine now, this generosity may not
persist after the presidential elections.
The situation in Ukraine is slightly more complicated. The country’s leadership desperately needs
cheaper gas to satisfy the needs of the oligarchs who support it. With parliamentary elections
rapidly approaching, re-election campaigns will rely on the financial support of these businessmen.
The Russia-Ukraine gas deal was negotiated by then Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who is
currently the leader of Ukraine’s opposition. In October of last year, Tymoshenko was sentenced to
seven years in prison following what the majority of European politicians and observers deemed a
selective, politically motivated prosecution. Against this background, it is highly unlikely that
Ukraine’s case against Russia will be treated as purely commercial.
Ukraine may also be forced to default on its financial obligations to Gazprom. The country’s coffers
are virtually empty. The International Monetary Fund is unlikely to offer any assistance before the
government raises domestic gas prices, which is unlikely to happen before the October
parliamentary elections. Kyiv could continue borrowing from Gazprombank to cover its bills with
Gazprom.
The experience of neighbouring Belarus provides a cautionary tale. President Lukashenka was
heavily subsidized by Moscow and even succeeded in ensuring the cheapest gas supply in Europe
—$164 per 1000 cubic meters in 2012. But he had to give up full control of the country’s pipeline to
Russia.
Protracted negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow are therefore likely to continue. The country’s
leadership and fellow oligarchs benefit the most from Ukraine’s transit system, with its underground
storage facilities and access it provides to Ukraine’s domestic market. Membership in the Customs
Union would effectively lead the president to lose political control over the country as greater control
over the country’s trade and economic policy are ceded to Moscow. Yanukovych will therefore
continue his balancing act, insisting for revisions to the 2009 gas deal, while avoiding moves that
might push Russia to escalate.
Ukraine needs to decrease its dependence on Russian gas
Having concluded the gas deal with Russia in 2009, Kyiv had an opportunity to overhaul its energy
sector, but, thus far focused on short-term solutions, such as the unsuccessful attempts to revise the
gas contract with Russia. One of the clearest examples of Ukraine’s underwhelming performance in
this area is its membership in the Energy Community. The mission of this organization is to extend
the EU’s internal energy market to southeast Europe and ultimately to ensure the security of the
supply in wider Europe. In 2010, Ukraine committed to implementing the relevant EU directives and
regulations in the sphere of gas, electricity, and renewable energy resources.
According to a group of independent Ukrainian energy analysts, however, the country has not fully
implemented a single obligation. Experts suggest that the Ukrainian authorities saw membership in
the Energy Community as a safeguard against the South Stream project and a source of additional
financial support from the EU. For its part, the EU hoped that Ukraine’s commitment and extra
funding would finally push Ukraine to reform its energy sector. Mutual disappointment is growing.
Ukraine feels that the EU is not being supportive in the country’s talks with Russia, and that this can
be attributed to Moscow’s warm relations with some EU member states. However, the EU is simply
reluctant to become embroiled in escalating tensions between Kyiv and Moscow. The EU, in turn,
feels frustrated by the lack of reform in Kyiv, and now has little reason to support Ukraine in this
battle. Failure to implement the Energy Community Treaty obligations was merely one incident in a
negative trend in Ukraine that is sending a clear signal to the EU: the country’s leadership is not
interested in further integration with the Union.
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